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Ineffectiveness at Its Best: Fighting Terrorism
with Economic Sanctions
Alan Einisman
INTRODUCTION
I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find
that the grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists ... consti-
tute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, for-
eign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a
national emergency to deal with that threat.1
One could argue that fighting terrorism is much like fight-
ing a neighborhood bully: you have to come at him fast and
hard, tit for tat. If you do not, the bully will keep coming back
for your lunch money. Imagine if the victim were to say to the
bully, "Bully, as punishment for your behavior, I will no longer
hand over my money." Clearly, this would not change the bully's
behavior. In essence, an economic sanction has the same effect
on a terrorist.
In the opening quotation, President Clinton used under-
standably strong language: statistics show that terrorist acts
are on the rise, and they are spreading across a wide geographi-
cal spectrum.2 In 1998, terrorist bombs destroyed the American
embassies in both Tanzania and Kenya. The bombs exploded
within minutes of each other, killing over 263 people and injur-
ing more than 5,000.3 Further, in January 1999, it was reported
that four persons with alleged ties to the same group responsible
for the African bombings were arrested in a plot to blow up U.S.
consulates in India.4
1. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 F.R. 5079 (1995).
2. See JEFFREY IAN Ross, DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM 27-30 (David A. Charters ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1991). See
also, Report: Embassy Attacks Fuel Record Toll of Terrorism, MINEAPOLs STAR
TRIB., May 1, 1999, at A6 ("Terrorism took a record toll last year [1998], with
741 people killed and 5,952 injured.").
3. Michael Grunwald, U.S. Complaint Links Bin Laden to Bombing,
WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at Al. See generally William Claiborne, Bombs at 2
U.S. Embassies in Africa Kill 81; 8 Americans Among the Dead, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 1998, at Al (explaining how embassies in Tanzania and Kenya blew up
within minutes if each other).
4. See Four Are Arrested in Alleged Plot to Blow Up U.S. Consulates in
India, MINEAPOLIS STAR TmB., Jan. 21, 1999, at A4. U.S. intelligence officials,
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The United States spends approximately $7 billion a year to
combat terrorism,5 and this figure is expected to rise.6 On Sep-
tember 21, 1998, President Clinton addressed the United Na-
tions and called for a global effort to combat terrorism.7
Announcing that combating terrorism was at the top of the
country's agenda, he stated his intent to ask Congress for funds
to strengthen American embassies.8 In his remarks, he sug-
gested that the obligations of the U.S. in dealing with interna-
tional terrorism are: "To give terrorists no support, no
sanctuary, no assistance .... To bring pressure on states that
do. To act together to step up extradition and prosecution. To
sign the antiterror global convention." 9 Clearly, terrorism is not
exclusively an American or Western problem. 10
While economic sanctions should play an important role in
dealing with terrorist states, 1 alone they may be insufficient
given the emergence of wealthy, independently financed ter-
rorists. An example is Osama bin Laden,' 2 the de facto "go-to"
guy for this type of terrorist threat. He is widely acknowledged
as the mastermind and financier of recent attacks against Amer-
icans abroad, including the aforementioned embassy attacks.' 3
however, found no link between the men arrested and bin Laden's organization.
Id.
5. See John Diamond, Use of Antiterror Funds Hard to Track, US Audi-
tors Find, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 1998, at A3.
6. See id.
7. See Clinton Tells U.N. That Global Effort Needed to Prevent, Punish
Terrorism, MINNEAPOLIs STAR Tam., Sept. 22, 1998, at A8.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; in fact, some commentators have
stated that modern terrorism has its roots in the French Revolution. See JOHN
F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 4 (1989).
11. Beginning in the 1970's, sanctions played an important role in the
America's attempt to curb international involvement in terrorism. Many fed-
eral statutes authorize the President to limit trade and economic relations with
countries that the Secretary of State has determined support terrorism. See
Murhpy, supra note 10, at 69.
12. Osama bin Laden is a Saudi-born multimillionaire who uses his vast
amounts of money to finance his terrorist network. See John F. Harris, Presi-
dent Freezes Bin Laden's Assets; Clinton Targets Global Support, WASH. POST,
Aug. 23, 1998, at Al ("Bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire ... sponsors his terror
campaign with a 'far-flung business empire,' that runs 'the gamut from agricul-
tural companies to banking and investment firms, to construction companies
13. For detailed background information on bin Laden, see generally John
Barry, Christopher Dickey & Steve LeVine, Making a Symbol of Terror, NEWS-
WEEK, Mar. 1, 1999, at 40 (detailing bin Laden's upbringing and general
history).
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He and his network of terrorists provide a perfect example of
what one official has referred to as "a murky network of home-
grown, privately financed and largely independent groups."14
This Note argues that the U.S. Government relies too heav-
ily on economic sanctions when fighting terrorism. Section I
provides background information, including a definition of ter-
rorism and economic sanctions. Section II analyzes the effec-
tiveness of economic sanctions in curbing terrorism. Finally,
Section III suggests alternatives that the U.S. has at its disposal
to deal with terrorism.
SECTION I - BACKGROUND
One of the most troublesome aspects of terrorism is the lack
of consensus as to what exactly constitutes "terrorism." Accord-
ingly, an examination of the terms "terrorism" and "economic
sanction" is necessary.
A. TERRORISM DEFINED
An important problem that has plagued many scholars is
that of defining exactly what terrorism is.15 For example, one
may argue that there is really no difference between a terrorist
and freedom fighter. The United States Congress defines an act
of international terrorism as one "which is violent or dangerous
to human life and that is a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States ... and which appears to be intended to intimi-
date or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct
of a government by assassination or kidnapping." 16 The main
problem with fighting terrorism is that terrorist groups are un-
14. David B. Ottaway, U.S. Considers Slugging it Out with International
Terrorism; Aides Split on Whether to Target Groups or States That Sponsor
Them, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1996, at A25.
15. For more detail, see Murphy, supra note 10, at 14-16 (explaining how
the U.S. has defined terrorism in the past). Additionally, for a thorough discus-
sion, see generally Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Re-
sponses to Terrorism, 2 Touro J. Transnat'l L. 67, 80-95 (1991) (discussing
different definitions of terrorism).
16. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act § 14, 50 U.S.C.A.
1701 (1991). See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3077 (1985), which defines a terrorist act as
an activity that involves a violent or dangerous act towards human life which
violates the laws of the United States or States. The act must appear to intimi-
date the civilian population or influence the policy of a government by intimida-
tion, assassination or kidnapping.
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
like a country's military. Rather, they are small groups, which
makes them hard to track, hard to infiltrate, and hard to stop. 17
B. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
In general, economic sanctions may be defined as "coercive
measures taken against one or more countries to force a change
in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country's opinion about
the other's policies."1 8 Proponents of economic sanctions argue
that sanctions are effective because they reduce the target coun-
try's economic welfare and thereby force that government's re-
gime to give in and abandon its objectionable policy.19 Economic
sanctions are ordinarily imposed in the form of trade embargoes,
restrictions on imports and exports, denial of foreign assistance
(including loans and investments), the freezing of foreign assets,
and the prohibition of economic transactions between U.S. com-
panies and the sanctioned state.20
In general, there are three instances in which a government
will employ economic sanctions.21 First, a single country or a
group of nations will often impose sanctions against a country
whose actions or policies endanger the economy or security of
the sanctioning country or its allies. 22 A second scenario is one
in which the sanctioning country attempts to force its ideology
upon the sanctioned country. An example of this would be the
multilateral sanctions imposed on South Africa during its
apartheid era.2 3 Finally, sanctions are becoming an increas-
ingly popular tool for dealing with trade policy and commercial
relations.2 4 For example, if a country implements a protection-
ist policy which puts a trading partner at an economic disadvan-
tage, the harmed country might retaliate with sanctions. The
17. See Charles E. Schumer, Terrorism Must Not be Allowed to Hide its
Face, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 1 (1996).
18. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DwIsION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE To CURRENT LAw (1997). Author David Baldwin
states that some have defined the term "economic sanctions" as diplomatic pres-
sure on other states that discourage trade with the targeted state. See DAVID
BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 35-36 (1985).
19. See WILLIAM H. KAEMPFER & ANTON D. LOWENBERG, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 161 (1992).
20. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LAw supra note 18, at 1.
21. See Kaempfer, supra note 19, at 1.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1-2.
24. See id. at 2.
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first and second forms are utilized by countries which use sanc-
tions as a way of fighting terrorism: sanctions are imposed for
both security and ideological reasons. 25
1. Factors Used to Determine Whether Sanctions Are a Viable
Option:
Among the factors used to determine whether a country
should use economic sanctions are: geographic proximity, trade
volume, a country's wealth, and whether the country is a mem-
ber of a common trading block.26
Examples of the effect of geographic proximity on the suc-
cess of economic sanctions are the U.S. sanctions and embargoes
on Iran and Cuba. Due to Cuba's proximity to the U.S., the task
of monitoring is inherently easier than it would be for a more
distant country like Iran. The U.S. can keep a closer watch on
what is going on in and around Cuba, while doing the same in
Iran would require more supplies and more tax dollars. 27
Trade volume is also important. If the U.S. exports a large
quantity of a given product to a country, sanctions or an em-
bargo may not be the best option simply because the U.S. could
harm its own industries, thus resulting in lost business, income,
and tax revenue. Moreover, if the U.S. imports a large quantity
of a given product, the damage to consumers might outweigh the
rationale behind imposing sanctions. 28
25. Additionally, trade embargoes may be imposed on a country as part of a
sanction. Embargoes can take the form of primary or secondary boycotts. A
primary boycott involves a government prohibition of both importing and ex-
porting. A secondary boycott involves the boycotting of third countries that deal
with the targeted country, and serves as an attempt to limit the extent of busi-
ness that third-party countries can do with a targeted country. For a more de-
tailed discussion, see generally Raj Bhala, National Security and International
Trade Law: What the GATT Says and What the U.S. Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 263, 284 (1998) (detailing the role sanctions play in international
trade).
26. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS To ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN
PouIcY GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LAw supra note 18, at 4. See
also, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Kimberly Ann Elliott,Tess Cyrus & Elizabeth Win-
ston, U.S. Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages (vis-
ited Oct. 24, 1998) <http'J/www.iie.com/catalog/wp/1997/sanction/sanctnwp.
htm> ("[B]ilateral trade will increase.., if the two countries share a common
border or a common language, or are both members of the same trading bloc.").
27. See Hufbauer, supra note 26 ("[Tlhe amount of trade between two coun-
tries will be ... negatively related to the distance between them.").
28. In the 1970's, the Arab countries placed an embargo on oil, which led to
a steep increase in prices of gasoline. See Bernard Wysocki Jr., Essay: Oil
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An equally significant factor is wealth. If a country has a
vast amount of it, like Saudi Arabia, the imposition of sanctions
will have little impact due to the sheer amount of resources
available to its government. On the other hand, sanctions have
a more detrimental effect on the population of a poor country
such as North Korea.29
Finally, the United States is a member of many trading
blocks, both regional30 and international.3 ' Sanctions could vio-
late existing trade agreements and subject the U.S to retalia-
tion. For example, if the United States were to impose sanctions
on Mexico, and a dispute settlement panel finds that the sanc-
tions were unwarranted, the Mexican Government could re-
spond with an embargo on U.S. imports. This could hurt many
American industries and corporations and have a potentially
devastating effect on jobs. It is noteworthy that the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) incorporates GATT
Article XI:1, which creates a violation whereby a dispute settle-
ment panel can give a winning plaintiff the right to retaliate in a
situation similar to the one mentioned above. 32
C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FREQUENTLY USED TO
IMPLEMENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
Sanctions, in all forms, are a frequently used tool to imple-
ment U.S. foreign policy goals. In fact, they are used so often
that U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, a well-respected member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has referred to them
as an "epidemic."33 Indeed, the U.S. has imposed sanctions 115
times since World War I, 61 in the last five years alone.34 One
commentator has stated that "whenever tensions rise, sanctions
become the favorite tonic of American diplomacy." 35 Neverthe-
Megadeal Signals a World of Low Inflation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at B1
(The Arab oil embargo of 1973 led to the quadrupling of oil prices.).
29. See infra note 84.
30. The United States is a member of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), along with Mexico and Canada. See Preamble, NAFTA.
31. The United States is also a member of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995) (detailing
GATT and other Agreements).
32. See supra notes 30-31.
33. David S. Broder, Editorial, Sanctions Addicts, WASH. POST, June 24,
1998, at A17.
34. See id.
35. Gary Hufbauer, The Snake Oil of Diplomacy: When Tensions Rise, the
U.S. Peddles Sanctions, WASH. POST, July 12, 1998, at C1. See also Youssef M.
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less, economic sanctions play an important role in the foreign
policy of many nations, which routinely utilize sanctions in or-
der to attain other objectives, such as national, strategic and
economic goals.3 6
With the use of sanctions skyrocketing, both the Clinton Ad-
ministration and Congress have recently attempted to reform
the Government's use of them.3 7 The problem, some argue, is
that there must be more authority and flexibility for the Presi-
dent. These critics cite as an example the mandatory sanctions
that were imposed on India and Pakistan after their recent nu-
clear tests.3 8 In that instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions im-
mediately, pursuant to the Arms Export and Control Act,3 9 even
though it may not have been the best option available. Addition-
ally, a bipartisan Senate panel has been established to deal with
the over-use of economic sanctions. The panel's chair, U.S. Sen-
ator Mitch McConnell, explained that the panel's job is to bal-
ance America's economic interests with its desire to defeat
terrorism.40
D. CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN COMBArrING TERRORISM
Congress has consistently played an active role in dealing
with terrorism 41 because of the variety of means it has at its
Ibrahim, U.N. Votes, 157-2, in Nonbinding Referendum Against U.S. Embargo
of Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1998, at A12 ("Congress has been sanction happy
for some time.").
36. See Kaempfer, supra note 19, at 1.
37. See Broder, supra note 33. See also U.S. Changes Humanitarian Aid
Policy Towards Terrorist States, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 29, 1999, at A12
(explaining that the U.S. Government has eased sanctions on Iran, Libya and
Sudan in an effort to lessen the harmful effect that sanctions often have on the
citizens of a sanctioned country. The article states that this policy is part of a
broader attempt at revising current U.S. sanctions policy.).
38. See Thomas W. Lippman, Negotiations on Sanctions Open on Hill: Ad-
ministration Seeks Broader Discretion on Imposition of Penalties, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 1998, at A24.
39. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2799aa-1 (1994). Sections 101 and 102(b) authorize the
President to impose sanctions on a state when it detonates a nuclear explosive
device or assists another country in obtaining the technology to do so. See also
Determination No. 98-22, 63 F.R. 27665 (calling for the imposition of sanctions
on India after the nuclear detonation). But see the India-Pakistan Relief Act,
P.L. 105-277 (authorizing the President to waive the sanctions placed on these
two countries).
40. See Lippman, supra note 38.
41. See supra note 16. In 1917, Congress passed the "Trading with the En-
emy Act" which prohibits the United States Government and its citizens from
trading with countries which the United States considers an enemy. The ban
also included countries which were allied with America's enemies. 50 App.
U.S.C.A. §§ 1-44, 40 Stat. 411. See also, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620H,
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disposal. 42 Many of the laws that it has enacted show that sanc-
tions are not the exclusive means of response that a country may
use in dealing with terrorism or any other threat to its security.
This does not mean, however, that Congress' job is easy. While
serving as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Sena-
tor Charles Schumer described terrorism as being invisible. By
its very nature, he said, it lies concealed, strikes with stealth
and surprise, and is directed against innocent and unprepared
people. 43 These factors make it difficult for public policy makers
to curb terrorism.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to lay and col-
lect taxes and to provide for the general defense and welfare of
the United States.4 Simply put, Congress appropriates the
funds for any proposed actions. Additionally, the Senate has the
authority to give advice and consent to the President when deal-
ing with international treaties.45 This is important because if
the U.S. wants to impose bilateral or multilateral sanctions on a
terrorist-supporting country,46 the President must first obtain
the Senate's consent. Congress also has the powers to raise and
22 U.s.c. 2378 (1996) (prohibiting foreign assistance to countries that provide
military assistance to terrorist states); Arms Export Control Act § 40A, 22
U.S.C. 2780 (1986) (prohibiting sale, transfer, lease, loan, grant, credit, or for-
eign assistance associated with munitions to terrorist states); International Se-
curity and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 § 505, 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9
(1985) (authorizing the President to ban importation of goods and services from
a state found to support international terrorism); International Financial Insti-
tutions Act § 1621, 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q (1996) (opposing international financial
institution loans to terrorist states); Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2
(b)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B) (1945) (denying Bank support where the Presi-
dent determines that it is in the Unites States' best interests related to terror-
ism, nuclear proliferation, human rights and environmental protection). The
Acts listed here are only a sample of the numerous pieces of legislation that
Congress has passed.
42. Historically, Congress has used sanctions as a common response to in-
cidences of terrorism by appropriating money and making laws to combat ter-
rorism. See e.g., supra note 41.
43. Schumer, supra note 17, at 1.
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 1. It is said that Congress has the
.power of the purse." Congress appropriates funds to support programs.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
46. Currently, the U.S. identifies Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Su-
dan and Syria as countries that support terrorism. See Anne Q. Connaughton,
Exporting to Special Destinations: Terrorist-Supporting and Embargoed Coun-
tries, 748 PLI/Comm 353, 368 (1996). However, the President may also sanc-
tion countries not included on this list. For example, President Clinton banned
all commercial and financial dealings between the U.S. and the Taliban, Af-
ghanistan's ruling militia, due to its refusal to extradite bin Laden. The execu-
tive order freezes the Taliban's assets in the U.S., bars Afghani imports, and
makes it illegal for U.S. companies to sell goods or services to the Taliban. See
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support armies 47 and to declare war.48 Significantly, should the
President decide to retaliate with armed force against a terrorist
state or terrorist group, he may have to wait for formal approval
from the Congress. While there are other relevant Constitu-
tional powers that the House and Senate have at their disposal,
the foregoing are significant because many times, a single
branch of the U.S. Government may not be able to act
unilaterally.
Furthermore, Congress may, in conjunction with the Execu-
tive Branch, take a proactive role and implement legislation
that has a direct affect on terrorism. A recent illustration of this
is the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA).4 9 ILSA im-
poses sanctions on any foreign company or companies that in-
vest in certain sectors of the Iranian or Libyan economies.5 0 The
purpose of ILSA is to stifle the flow of currency going into these
terrorist-sponsoring states. It requires the President to impose
two out of six types of sanctions on any country that violates the
statute. They include: (1) A refusal of Import-Export Bank
assistance for exports; (2) The denial of export licenses for goods
and controlled technology; (3) A prohibition on U.S. institutions
from making loans of more than $10 million to the sanctioned
government; (4) A prohibition on foreign institutions from acting
as a dealer in U.S. debt instruments; (5) A prohibition on the
U.S. government from acquiring goods or services from a sanc-
tioned country; and (6) A restriction imports from the sanctioned
country.5 1
E. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
A dimension of terrorism that further complicates the issue
is state-sponsored terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism may be
defined as "the undertaking or encouragement by the authori-
ties of a state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state of
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in an-
John Lancaster, Afghanistan Rulers Accused of Giving Terrorist Refuge; Clin-
ton Bans Trading With Taliban Militia, WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at A15.
47. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 8, c. 12.
48. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 11.
49. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West
Supp. 1996).
50. Sanctions are imposed if the President determines that a business en-
tity (which can be a person or a government acting as a business) invests, with
knowledge, $40 million or more. See id.
51. See id. §§ 6(2-6).
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other state .... "52 An example of state-sponsored terrorism is
Libya's involvement in numerous terrorist attacks in the
1980's,5 3 where it has been alleged that the Libyan Government
committed its own resources to attacks in Vienna, Rome, West
Berlin and Pan Am Flight 103. 54 Many commentators and
policymakers seem to view state-sponsored terrorism as a form
of "low intensity warfare"55 against the West. To illustrate,
President Reagan said upon ordering the embargo of Libya that
by providing support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citi-
zens, a country engages in armed aggression, just as if it had
used its own forces.5 6
Possibly the most common response to the state sponsorship
of terrorism is the sanction.5 7 Sanctions are largely unilateral
measures imposed by the U.S. on a terrorist state.58 Some com-
mentators have posited that unilateral sanctions accomplish lit-
tle because the sanctioned state is able to obtain goods from
other countries or sources.5 9 Conversely, others have cited
South Africa as an example of how multilateral sanctions were
effective in forcing the South African Government to change its
apartheid policies.60 One could argue that multilateral sanc-
tions are more effective than unilateral sanctions because the
sanctioned state will find it more difficult to obtain goods and
services if they are isolated by a greater number of countries.
F. RATIONALES BEHIND THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Imposing costs on a terrorist state may be the most custom-
ary rationale for using economic sanctions.6 ' The country im-
posing the sanctions links trade, foreign assistance, arms sales
and other international economic transactions to modifications
in the target state's behavior: if the targeted state acts in ways
52. Murphy, supra note 10, at 5.
53. See Dante B. Fascell, Combating International Terrorism: The Role of
Congress, 16 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 655, 656 (1986).
54. See id.
55. Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism,
20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 304 (1987).
56. See id. at 304-305 (President Reagan made these remarks when he or-
dered the embargo of Libya in 1986.).
57. See id. at 289-292.
58. See id. at 292.
59. See, e.g., id. at 305 (stating that sanctions are unlikely to reduce the
economic capacity of the sanctioned state); see also Hufbauer, supra note 35
(sanctions seldom achieve the desired change).
60. See Hufbauer, supra note 35.
61. See Abbott, supra note 55, at 301.
[Vol. 9:299
2000] FIGHTING TERRORrSM WITH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 309
considered inappropriate by the sanctioning state - by support-
ing terrorist activities, for example - the sanctioning state sus-
pends those transactions, thus imposing costs on the target's
economy.62 If the sanctions work, the sanctioning state will
then permit normal relations to continue.63
Additionally, sanctions are often viewed as a more peaceful
means of achieving change than armed force. 64 One commenta-
tor theorized that sanctions are more effective than words at
communicating the sanctioning country's commitment to a par-
ticular position, the earnestness with which it views any given
foreign conduct, and its intention and willingness to act and
bear costs. Sanctions can also communicate moderation and re-
straint, which could avoid unnecessary conflict.65 Moreover, the
U.S. State Department, in a 1986 report, called sanctions an in-
tegral part of peaceful measures that can be used to deter states
from supporting terrorism and they may also be used to pres-
sure targeted states to change their policies. 66
Some commentators argue, however, that as terrorist
groups become self-reliant, sanctions imposed on states accom-
plish very little.67 They posit that sanctioning terrorist-support-
ing states is probably ill advised,68 arguing that embargoes are
unlikely to have an effect on the capacity of a state to support
terrorism.69 It is because of this issue, the emergence of the self-
reliant terrorist, that sanctions are less likely to have an impact
on international terrorism.
SECTION II - ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
As previously stated, the U.S. Government frequently uses
economic sanctions to implement its foreign policy goals. One
observer theorizes that the United States no longer has one en-
emy (communism) and therefore has to look for new measures to
fight terrorism. 70 The problem is that the U.S. military was
62. See id. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 527, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (If
the President determines that a country grants sanctuary to or supports inter-
national terrorism, bilateral assistance will not be made available.).
63. See, e.g., The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, § 8 (If Iran or Libya
change their policies, renouncing terrorism, the sanctions cease to have affect.
The President, however, must certify his findings to Congress first.).
64. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 69.
65. See Abbott, supra note 55, at 303.
66. See id. at 306.
67. See Ross, supra note 2, at 39.
68. See Abbott, supra note 55, at 305.
69. See id.
70. See Bhala, supra note 25, at 263.
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designed to counter threats by China and the former Soviet
Union, not to deal with the more unconventional threats by ter-
rorists. 7 1 Accordingly, the United States is increasingly inclined
to use unilateral international trade measures regardless of op-
position from its allies and trading partners. 72
Many argue that, despite their popularity, economic sanc-
tions are ineffective in achieving their goals.73 One observer
said:
Most economists who have studied economic sanctions believe that
sanctions are ineffective because they do not impose significant eco-
nomic damage on the target nation. This reflects the traditional view
that sanctions work by creating economic hardship in the target. Ac-
cording to this view, the typically small impact of sanctions is largely
due to the efficiency of international goods and capital markets and the
consequent ease with which target countries can find alternative
sources of supply and alternative markets to substitute for the
sanctioners.7
4
A. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE COSTLY
Each time a government imposes economic sanctions, there
is a reciprocal effect on its own economy. Thus, when the United
States imposes sanctions in the name of fighting terrorism, it
does so at the expense of its own economy. 75 Indeed, the more
countries that the U.S. targets, the more economic opportunity it
loses. One recent study found that the U.S. sanctioned 30 coun-
tries between 1993-1996.76 In a different study, the Institute for
International Economics (I.I.E.) found that "U.S. sanctions in
1995 may have reduced U.S. exports to 26 target countries by as
much as $15 billion to $19 billion... [Tihat would mean a reduc-
tion of more than 200,000 jobs in the relatively higher-wage ex-
port sector and a consequent loss of nearly $1 billion annually in
export sector wage premiums."77 The U.S. Department of Com-
merce stated in a 1996 study that, in 1992, $1 billion worth of
goods or services exported supported 15,500 jobs, including the
exporting firms and their suppliers. 78 The I.I.E. concluded that
workers could have lost between $800 million and $1 billion in
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Kaempfer, supra note 19, at 2.
74. Id. at 3.
75. See generally Bhala, supra note 25, at 313-314 (explaining how the U.S.
workforce loses money on exports and suffers job loss due to sanctions).
76. See Hufbauer, supra note 26.
77. Id.
78. See id.
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export sector wages in 1995.7 9 Significantly, these numbers sug-
gest that the government loses a large amount of tax revenues.
Economic sanctions also affect U.S. firms after the sanctions
have been lifted. In her comments before the Subcommittee on
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, Kimberly Ann
Elliott 0 stated that U.S. firms may be viewed as unreliable sup-
pliers because the U.S. government is "sanctions-happy." The
result is that countries may avoid buying from or doing business
with U.S. companies, thus giving the U.S.'s foreign competitors
an advantage in those lost markets.8 ' This is yet another reason
why sanctions should be viewed skeptically as a means of fight-
ing terrorism.
The frequency with which the U.S. government uses sanc-
tions as a shield to stop terrorism is frightening, given statistics
indicating that terrorist acts are on the rise.8 2 In light of the
fact that American businesses bear the brunt of the seemingly
ineffective sanctions and embargoes, the U.S. Government
should reexamine its policy of using sanctions to combat terror-
ism. Is it worth the cost? Some might argue that in certain cir-
cumstances,' it is. In most cases, however, it is not. The costs
are too great and the payoff too small.
When a country imposes sanctions, the population of the
targeted country will inevitably feel its effects in both economic
and human terms. One writer aptly noted that "[i]f there is an
economic impact on the targeted country, too often it is felt by its
oppressed population, not the smug, well-insulated rulers."83
The populations of North Korea and Iraq, two countries recog-
nized by the United States as supporters of terrorism and ac-
cordingly sanctioned, have suffered greatly from starvation and
disease.8 4 Furthermore, during a recent trip to Cuba, another
79. See id.
80. In 1997, Ms. Elliott was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Interna-
tional Economics.
81. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Eco-
nomic Sanctions (visited Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.iie.comItestimony/sanctns.
htm>.
82. See Ross, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
83. Broder, supra note 33.
84. Many news organizations have reported on the effects that sanctions
have on a country's population. Specifically, the leaders of the targeted coun-
tries keep their citizens from obtaining food and other essentials. The govern-
ment takes their remaining resources and either diverts them to the military or
simply keeps them for themselves. See, e.g., David MacIntyre, Missile With a
Message: While North Koreans Starve, Kim Jong II Shows Off His New Tech-
nology, TIME, Sept. 14, 1998, at 55 ("famine has killed an estimated 2 million
people in North Korean since 1995"); Bruce W. Nelan, The Politics of Famine
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country on the receiving end of economic sanctions, Pope John
Paul II stated that sanctions are always deplorable, because
they hurt those most in need.85 Again, the U.S. must consider
whether the humanitarian costs on these populations are worth
the imposition of sanctions that historically have had little effect
on terrorism.
B. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS, OFTEN USED BY THE UNITED
STATES, ARE INEFFECTIVE
"Only if sanctions are universal, in the sense that all trading partners
are united in a binding cartel agreement to refuse to sell or to buy any or
most goods from the target country, will boycotts have a severe wealth-
reducing effect." 86
A 1996 report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict reported that between 1914 and 1990, sanctions
were imposed 116 times in attempts to change foreign policy
goals.87 These sanctions were successful in barely one-third of
Millions in North Korea Face Starvation; But Everyone Insists on Playing Cyni-
cal Games With Their Lives, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 50 ("Pyongyang is trying to
use its citizens' hunger as a bargaining chip, arguing that Washington should
deliver massive food aid ... The U.S. wants to make sure its aid is not being
siphoned off to fatten the diet of North Korea's oversize, 1.1 million-strong
army."); Mark Hosenball & Sarah Van Boven, The Battle in the Aisles: A Black
Market in Baby Formula in Iraq Leads to a Scam That Has Crack Addicts
Shoplifting in Middle America, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 1997, at 41 ("Because of the
gulf war and ensuing U.N. sanctions against a defiant Saddam Hussein, baby
food is exceedingly hard to come by in Iraq; according to UNICEF, 32 percent of
children under the age of 5 are seriously malnourished."); Marian Houk, UN
Weighs Evidence on Iraqi Nuclear Plans, Aid Needs, CHRisT4IN SCI. MONITOR,
July 17, 1991, at 3 (A U.N. special envoy who visited Iraq to assess the effects of
sanctions on civilians stated that "the impact of sanctions had been, and re-
mains, very substantial on the economy and living conditions of its civilian pop-
ulation . . . ."). But see supra note 37 and accompanying text (sanctions are
being eased on certain countries for humanitarian reasons).
It is important to note, however, that on September 18, 1999, the United
States lifted its trade embargo on North Korea in exchange for North Korea's
pledge to refrain from test-firing a long range missile. These developments are
significant: most trade in consumer goods and raw materials will now be legal,
U.S. airlines will now be able to land in North Korea, and U.S. companies will
now be able to invest in North Korea. Only trade in goods that have a military
use will be prohibited. See John Burgess, U.S. Lifts Key Facets of N. Korea
Embargo: Some Trade, Investment to Be Legal, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1999, at
Al.
85. See Hufbauer, supra note 26.
86. Kaempfer, supra note 19, at 21.
87. John Stremlau, Carnegie Commission On Preventing Deadly Conflict,
Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward A Stronger Role For The United
Nations (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/summary/su96-01.
html>.
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the cases. The U.S. itself imposed 70 percent of all sanctions
during that period, most of which were unilateral.88 It therefore
seems that unilateral sanctions are unsuccessful most of the
time.
In addition to the foregoing, there are two additional impor-
tant problems with unilateral sanctions: (1) they are difficult to
enforce; and (2) the targeted country is able to get goods and
supplies from a different country. Since 1970, only 13 percent of
unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. achieved their stated
foreign policy goal.8 9 Importantly, there seems to be an increas-
ing number of independently financed terrorist groups combined
with less state involvement.90 Osama bin Laden and Hamas are
two examples of this trend. Neither group relies on direct or
overt state support in its activities. Bin Laden is independently
wealthy,91 while Hamas raises funds to carry out its opera-
tions.92 Indeed, imposing sanctions on a country may not have
an effect on the secretive terrorist groups operating within its
borders.
The United States' failure to consistently enforce its terror-
ist-related laws is a serious problem. Within the past few years,
88. See id. Unilateral sanctions are those sanctions which are imposed by
one country against another. For example, the U.S. imposed sanctions against
Sudan in November, 1997. In the executive order, President Clinton cited Su-
dan's sponsorship of international terrorism as a ground for the sanctions. See
Exec. Order No. 13, 067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,989 (1997)(holding Sudan responsible
for acts of international terrorism). See also Wynn H. Segall, Running on
Empty: Economic Sanctions and Export Controls in 1997, 32 INT'L LAW. 271,
275 (1998) (stating that Sudan's sponsorship of terrorism was cited as a ground
for the embargo in the executive order).
Conversely, multilateral sanctions are those which are imposed by two or
more countries against another country. An oft-cited example of the success of
multilateral sanctions is South Africa. Numerous countries imposed sanctions
and embargoes on the South Africa in order to force its government to halt
apartheid policies. See Hufbauer, supra note 27. Additionally, the Bonn Decla-
ration is a multilateral agreement between the U.S. and six of its allies which
attempts to halt bilateral air traffic to those countries that will not prosecute or
extradite airplane hijackers. See Abbott, supra note 55, at 307.
89. See Elliott, supra note 81, at 2 and accompanying text.
90. Secretary of State Madeline Albright recently stated that while state
sponsored terrorism continues to decline, the 'progress has been countered by
the rise of terrorist groups that are less directly dependent on states." Report:
Embassy attacks fuel record toll of terrorism, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 1,
1999, at A6.
91. See Harris, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
92. Hamas, founded in 1987, is an Islamic militant group operating out of
the West Bank and Gaza. For a more detailed discussion of Hamas, see Daniel
Williams, Hamas's Disarray Increases Dangers, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at
All (explaining general background information on Hamas).
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Congress enacted laws imposing secondary sanctions on foreign
entities that do business with countries sanctioned by the U.S.:
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)93 and the Helms-Bur-
ton Act.94 These pieces of legislation are useless, however, un-
less there is some level of enforcement on the countries that
violate the embargoes. The end result, in many cases, is that
there is no enforcement. Most recently, three companies from
three different countries violated ILSA by signing a contract to
develop offshore gas fields in Iran.95 Secretary of State Made-
line Albright found that the deal, which involved companies
from France, Russia and Malaysia, met the criteria established
by the law to receive sanctions. However, senior members of
Congress pressured the Clinton Administration to waive the
sanctions in order to avoid a trade war with Europe and to pre-
vent a potential dispute with Russia.96
Moreover, the Administration has been reluctant to take ac-
tion against both the European Union and Canada, who con-
tinue to invest in Cuba, for violating the Helms-Burton Act.97
For example, since its enactment, President Clinton has ordered
two six-month suspensions of the law. 98 Quite simply, if the
U.S. chooses to enact laws such as these, it must stringently en-
force them or it runs the risk of acquiring an international repu-
tation as a pushover. An apt critic has stated that "[i]f sanctions
have any chance at all of producing favorable outcomes, they
must be multilateral, they must be carefully formulated, and
they must be vigorously enforced."99
The main reason why unilateral sanctions do not work may
be that targeted countries often have other means of obtaining
the goods or services that are being denied to them by the sanc-
tioning country. If the U.S. denies imports or exports to a
targeted nation, there are numerous other counties willing to as-
sist or deal with the targeted state. For example, when the U.S.
93. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
94. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021, 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
95. See generally Total-Led Group Investing $2 Billion in Iranian Oil Field,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1997, at A19 (detailing the French company's plan to
invest in Iranian oil).
96. See Thomas W. Lippman, Politicians At Odds on Sanctions as Policy;
Administration Says Tool Can Be Costly, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A17.
97. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Holds Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few,
E.U. Coolly Accepts Delay for Helms-Burton Law; Canada Reacts Harshly,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1997, at A9.
98. See id.
99. Elliott, supra note 81.
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unilaterally imposes sanctions on Iran and refuses to buy its oil,
the end result is negligible because the U.S. is only one of many
existing markets. Iran loses only America's business, which is
obviously not enough to force a policy change. Further, Libya is
the target of comprehensive unilateral sanctions by the United
States, but the Libyan Government continues to sell approxi-
mately $10 billion worth of oil to the Europeans each year. 100
A key to the success of sanctions is international coopera-
tion to ensure that the targeted country cannot circumvent the
sanctions. Indeed, if more nations are united in their resolve to
apply sanctions, there will be a greater economic impact of those
sanctions on the targeted nation. 1 1 Most countries, however,
will do what is in their own national interests, weakening the
impact of unilateral sanctions. 10 2 This makes it difficult to keep
the sanctioned country from obtaining goods from another coun-
try, or from selling its goods to other countries, but there are
other ways for targeted countries to escape sanctions. First, na-
tions may simply choose not to take part in the international call
for sanctions. 03 Second, a third-party nation can weaken the
effectiveness of sanctions by allowing goods across its border to a
sanctioned country.' 04 Finally, covert cheating between the
sanctioned country and another country, or within its own bor-
ders, can lessen the impact of sanctions on the target.'05
C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MAY UPSET U.S. ALLIES AND
TRADING PARTNERS
The United States belongs to regional and international
trading blocks,' 06 and is therefore obligated under the commit-
ments it has made to its trading partners.' 0 7 These commit-
100. See Stremlau, supra note 87, at <http://ccpdc.org/pubs/summary/su96
03.html>.
101. See Kaempfer, supra note 19, at 16.
102. See DAvID E. LONG, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM: NEW IN-
ITIATIVES 7 (Richard H. Ward & Ahmed Galal Ezeldin eds., 1990) ("There are
too many conflicting interests at stake; for example, billions of dollars in trade
with Libya would be lost by any country joining the United States in economic
sanctions."). See, e.g., 11 MARTHA CRENSHAW, INST. FOR EAST-WEST SEC. STUD-
IES, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 25 (1989) ("Although the in-
ternational community appears to recognize the need for cooperation against
terrorism, national interests have dominated the treatment of the issue .. .
103. See Kaempfer, supra note 19, at 66.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text.
107. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO THE
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 17-60 (3d ed. 1995)
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ments contain provisions which make it a violation for one
contracting party to enact a domestic law which restricts the im-
ports or exports of another contracting party simply because
that country has policies different from its own.' 0 8 Further-
more, when the U.S. implements secondary sanctions, as it does
with ILSA and Helms-Burton, it runs the risk of alienating and
upsetting its allies.
1. The Helms-Burton Act + ILSA = Angry Allies and is a
Violation of International Law:
Both the Helms-Burton Act' 0 9 and the ILSAi" 0 have an-
gered some of America's most important allies. The European
Union,"' Canada, and Mexico have all complained that the
United States is really trying to tell the rest of the world what
they can and cannot do.112 With fervor, Congress enacted these
laws in the name of combating terrorism, only to have the Clin-
ton Administration waive certain provisions and enrage the
aforementioned countries in the process." 83 In other words, the
(pages 17-30 contain the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as
amended). The Articles of the General Agreement, as well as its Panel deci-
sions, bind all contracting parties to the GATT treaty. For a historical overview
of the GATT, see generally, Georgia McCullough Mayman, The Iran Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996: Enforceable Response to Terrorism or Violation of Inter-
national Law?, 19 Whittier L. Rev. 137, 144-159 (1997).
108. In the United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico
case, an appellate panel held that "a contracting party may not restrict imports
of a product merely because it originates in a country with environmental poli-
cies from its own." 39th Supp. B.I.S.D. 155, para. 6.2 (1993). In a different
appellate decision, the Panel found the United States guilty of employing arbi-
trary and discriminatory measures to coerce other contracting parties to protect
sea turtles. The Panel said, "it is not acceptable, in international trade rela-
tions, for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require other Mem-
bers to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to
achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory,
without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the
territories of those other Members." United States: Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 164 (1998).
109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
111. "The Europeans bitterly resent U.S. efforts to impose penalties on for-
eign companies and pressure other governments in order to promote U.S. for-
eign policy goals." Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton, E. U. Ease Tension on Cuba
Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1997, at A3.
112. See Mayman, supra note 107, at 137 (this sentiment is from a French
Foreign Ministry spokesman).
113. See generally Helen Cooper et al., U.S. Ends Penalties Against Cuba
Trade, Pact With E. U. Includes Iran and Libya, but Congress is Likely to Fight
Move, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at A2 (detailing a possible change in the Clin-
ton Administration's policy towards foreign companies who trade with Cuba).
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United States views these laws as an important step in fighting
terrorism, 1 14 while their allies view them as violations of trade
agreements and international law. 115
The United States' trading partners also view these laws as
"extraterritorial," meaning that the U.S. is imposing its laws on
other sovereign nations.1 1 6 At one point, the European Union
was prepared to bring a complaint before the World Trade Or-
ganization, but postponed after the U.S. waived a provision of
Helms-Burton.1 1 7 In waiving the provision, President Clinton
stated that he would continue granting waivers as long as
America's friends and allies continue their efforts to promote
democratic reforms in Cuba. 118 Further, the Canadian Interna-
tional Trade Minister stated at one point that it is "unacceptable
for the U.S. to foist its foreign policy onto Canada, threatening
Canadian business and anybody else who wants to do business
legally with Cuba."1 1 9 These two laws bring up an important
issue: are they legal, as a matter of international law?
The international community has condemned the United
States' approach as contrary to traditional international and
treaty law. 120 In fact, several nations have retaliated against
Helms-Burton and ILSA by enacting blocking laws that basi-
cally prevent their citizens and companies from complying with
these laws. 121 For example, Canada has enacted the Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, which forbids Canadian citizens
and businesses from abiding by Helms-Burton. 22 The argu-
114. Former U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato, a sponsor of the ILSA, stated
that without the enforcement of the law, "[ilt will send a signal to others that
they can do business as usual with Iran, at a time when Iran continues to...
sponsor terrorist acts." Id.
115. A spokesman for a French company stated that ILSA is "a unilateral
American law which isn't recognized in France or in the European Community."
Greenberger supra note 95.
116. See Therese Raphael, U.S. and Europe Clash Over Cuba, WALL ST. J.,
Mar, 31, 1997, at A14. See also note 108 and accompanying text.
117. See Greenberger, supra note 111; see also Greenberger, supra note 97
(detailing the Clinton Administration's plan to appease its allies); see also supra
note 94. Section 306 of the Helms-Burton Act gives the President the authority
to suspend the implementation of the Act.
118. See Greenberger, supra note 97.
119. Id.
120. See Peter Glossop, Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act and
U.S. Restrictions on Trade with Cuba, 32 INT'L LAw. 93, 93 (1998).
121. See Harvey Oyer, The Extraterritorial Effects of U.S. Unilateral Trade
Sanctions and Their Impact on U.S. Trade Obligations Under NAFTA, 11 FLA.
J. INT'L L. 429, 430 (1997).
122. See generally Glossop, supra note 120, at 96-100 (explaining the law in
detail).
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ment is that the United States is violating international law,
based on simple notions of sovereignty. The principle of sover-
eignty generally holds that a country has the power to enact
whatever laws it deems necessary to govern its internal affairs,
but it cannot enact laws which govern the internal affairs of
other countries. 123 This is exactly what both ILSA and the
Helms-Burton Act do and are thus considered contrary to settled
principles of international law.
Rather than upset its allies with the threat of unilateral
sanctions, the United States must endeavor to recruit these
countries to join in issuing multilateral sanctions. 124 As stated,
unilateral sanctions have had virtually no effect on terrorism.
However, if the European Union and Canada were to join the
United States in imposing sanctions, they might be more effec-
tive. At this point, it is not worth upsetting our allies over an
ineffective policy.
2. Trading-block obligations:
As mentioned, the United States is a member of both GATT
and NAFTA.125 The rules and obligations that govern these
Agreements bind the United States. Due to the commitments of
member countries, barring Canada from conducting business
with whom it wants may, in principle, violate NAFTA.126 How-
ever, the U.S. justifies its actions in the name of national
security.127
Article XXI of GATT, the national security exception, states
that any contracting party may take measures which it deems
necessary to protect its national security interests. 28 The
United States has argued that countries which engage in terror-
123. See Oyer, supra note 121, at 439.
124. For example, one recent GATT Appellate Body opined that, rather than
force one country to comply with another's own policies via embargoes or sanc-
tions, a country should attempt to form multilateral agreements if alternative
measures are available (the U.S. should have attempted other agreements or
cooperative efforts before imposing import bans). United States: Import Prohi-
bition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prods., supra note 108, paras. 165-167.
125. See supra, notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text.
126. See Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions
Laws With Obligations Under The North American Free Trade Agreement, 27
STETSON L. REV. 1259, 1277 (1998)("Mhe entire tenor of the NAFTA is to fur-
ther open trade where not specifically restricted, and that sanctions laws such
as [Helms-Burton] violate the 'objectives' of (NAFTA]").
127. See generally Mayman, supra note 107.
128. See Jackson, supra note 106, at 46. For a comprehensive discussion of
national security and international trade law, see Bhala, supra note 25.
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ist activities pose a physical and economic threat to its secur-
ity.129 While this argument may be sound, the bottom line is
that in the eyes of its trading partners, the United States is vio-
lating the trade agreements to which it belongs, like GATT and
NAFTA.130
Trade between the U.S. and Canada, America's second larg-
est trading partner,' 31 is reported to be worth $400 billion a
year.' 32 Again, it is not worth angering our trading partners
and allies over a scheme that does not work. The U.S. cannot
single-handedly continue to sanction countries that promote ter-
rorism. Terrorism is a global problem that requires a global re-
sponse, and unilateral efforts are not accomplishing enough.
There has been no significant change in Iran's policies, for exam-
ple, 133 and all regimes are firmly in place despite the sanctions.
The United States, instead of breaching its trading obligations
and upsetting its allies, must rethink its approach to curbing
terrorism.
D. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM IS DECLINING WHILE
INDEPENDENT GROUPS ARE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE
An important issue in fighting terrorism is that the state
sponsorship of terrorism is declining. In 1997, the former direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that state-
sponsored terrorism is on the decline, partly because of the fall
of the former Soviet Union.' 3 4 He also stated that independent
terrorist groups are "proliferating and becoming a more serious
threat than state-sponsored terrorism."135 Furthermore, the
U.S. Department of State has reported that state involvement in
terrorism has declined, while groups not backed by any govern-
129. See Mayman, supra note 107, at 142.
130. As stated, many of America's most important trading partners, includ-
ing the countries of the European Union, have criticized the United States'
trade policies. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
131. See Editorial, U.S. May Pay Penalty for Misguided Use of Bad Law
Helms-Burton, aimed at Cuba, hits American trade ties, L.A. TimEs, July 12,
1996, at B8 ("In seeking to slap the hands of a company in Canada, the United
States hurts its own trade prospects.").
132. See id.
133. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 97.
134. See Editorial, Anti-terrorist Efforts Better Coordinated, SAN ANTONio
Exp.-NEws, June 29, 1997, at 2J. See also supra note 89 and accompanying
text.
135. Editorial, Anti-terrorist Efforts Better Coordinated, supra note 134.
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ment are on the rise. 136 As one commentator stated: "[Now,
the] enemy is a man, not a state, backed by acolytes, not ar-
mies."137 With the exception of Iran, none of the other seven
countries on the State Department's list of terrorist-supporting
states 3 8 have been involved in a terrorist attack against Ameri-
cans in years.' 39
How can sanctioning a country work to prevent private
groups from committing terrorist acts? This is a question which
U.S. policymakers are attempting to grapple with. The problem
is that these groups are stateless, and therefore out of reach of
U.S. sanctions. Osama bin Laden's organization, for example,
has no fixed headquarters or address. 140 Sanctions carried out
on these independent groups are largely irrelevant because they
are too blunt to pressure small groups. 14 1 In other words, using
sanctions to punish small, independent terrorist groups is the
equivalent of trying to kill a mosquito with a wrecking ball.
That said, what can the U.S. do to curb terrorist attacks? The
following section presents some options that should be
considered.
SECTION III - OPTIONS
The United States and its allies must review their policies
toward curbing terrorism. As argued, economic sanctions are
not the best option, but they may work if done correctly and in
conjunction with other methods.
1. Multilateral sanctions
It has been said that the ability of terrorists to commit
crimes in one country with weapons from another country
against citizens of a third country and flee yet to fourth country,
means that a unilateral terrorist policy raises serious
136. See Holger Jensen, Editorial, Searching for the Bombers; Plot to Strike
U.S. Embassies Probably Came from Outside Africa, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11,
1998, at B7.
137. Tim Weiner, 'War on Americans' is Declared, DENVER POST, Aug. 23,
1998, at Al.
138. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
139. See Weiner, supra note 137.
140. See id. See also Thomas W. Lippman, Taliban Says Bin Laden in Its
Sector of Afghanistan; Admission Comes Days After U.S. Sanctions, WASH.
POST, July 9, 1999, at A25 (stating that bin Laden frequently moves from camp
to camp in the Afghani Desert).
141. Abbott, supra note 55, at 306.
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problems. 142 States should rely heavily on international cooper-
ation in order to have an effective policy.
Multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral
sanctions because they prevent the targeted country from ob-
taining goods and services from other venues. Multilateral
sanctions may not work if the terrorist group moves from state
to state. However, if the group resides and trains in a single
country, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan, multilateral
sanctions could be imposed to force that country's government to
either arrest the terrorists or extradite them for trial. Finally,
multilateral sanctions show international unity, as they did in
South Africa during the apartheid era and throughout the Gulf
War in 1990 and 1991. The benefit of unity is that these terror-
ist organizations will run into a brick wall, rather than a mere
brick.
2. Armed response
It seems to have become more acceptable to counter terror-
ism with armed response than it was in the past. For instance,
President Reagan ordered attacks against Libya after a series of
terrorist bombings against American interests. 143 More re-
cently, President Clinton ordered attacks against Osama bin
Laden's terrorist bases in Afghanistan.'" In fact, it has been
reported that this strike was the largest military action ever
taken by a country against a private individual. 145 Shortly after
the bombing, Defense Secretary William Cohen stated that the
"strike against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan
should not be seen simply as a response to the August 7 bomb-
ings [of the American embassies in Africa], but as the long-term,
fundamental way in which the United States intends to combat
forces of terror."146
The actions by President Clinton and the statements by Sec-
retary Cohen signal a change in America's policy towards terror-
ism. In taking a more aggressive and controversial stance,
142. See Martha Crenshaw, Unintended Consequences: How Democracies
Respond to Terrorism, 21-FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 153, 159 (1997).
143. See Jim Hoagland, Editorial, One Raid In a Long War, WASH. POST,
Aug. 23, 1998, at C7.
144. See generally Guy Gugliotta and Juliet Eilperin, Tough Response Ap-
peals to Critics of President; Several Question Clinton's Timing of Raids, WASH.
POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A17 (outlining the U.S. raids on bin Laden's bases).
145. See Barry, supra note 13.
146. William S. Cohen, About Last Week: The Policy: We Are Ready to Act
Again, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at C1.
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America's policy will begin to resemble those of other countries
that deal with terrorism on a more regular basis. Some govern-
ments, such as that of Israel, have a policy calling for an imme-
diate response to terrorist acts against its citizens and interests.
Since 1953, the Israeli position has been that immediate retalia-
tion is a necessary aspect of self-defense. 147 While this view has
been criticized, 148 it does put potential terrorists on notice: if
you attack our citizens or our interests, you will face severe con-
sequences. The fact that the U.S. will now retaliate against both
terrorist-supporting states149 and host countries' 50 signals a
very important change, not only in policy, but also in America's
evolving views on terrorism. In addition to the Clinton Adminis-
tration, 151 both the Nixon and Reagan Administrations argued
that the right to strike at governments that offer sanctuary to
terrorists is rooted in international law.152 Indeed, according to
traditional principles of international law, every nation pos-
sesses the inherent and sovereign right of self-defense. 153 Thus,
if a country were to retaliate against another, either for harbor-
ing a terrorist or sponsoring the act itself, the retaliatory action
should not be viewed as aggressive. Rather, it should be viewed
as a duty owed to its citizenry: when our interests are targeted
147. See William V. O'rien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in
Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 421 (1990).
148. Armed force can often times start a sort of cat and mouse game,
whereby the terrorist group attacks a country, the country responds with force,
and the terrorist group attacks again, starting a cycle. Martha Crenshaw
stated that the use of force often backfires: "[Tihe use of force ... provides a
motive for future revenge on the part of [terrorist] groups." Crenshaw, supra
note 142, at 159 (1997). See also Murphy, supra note 15, at 79 ("Force is not a
long-term solution to terrorism. A State responding with force opens itself up to
retaliation and escalation.').
149. As previously stated, President Reagan bombed Libya in retaliation for
terrorist attacks against American targets. More recently, President Clinton
ordered the bombing of a factory in Sudan, which allegedly had been manufac-
turing chemical weapons.
150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text regarding the raids on Af-
ghanistan and Sudan.
151. Richard Clark, President Clinton's coordinator for counterterrorism,
recently stated, "We may not just go in a strike against a terrorist facility; we
may choose to retaliate against the facilities of the host country, if that host is a
knowing, cooperative sanctuary." U.S. asserts right to bomb regimes that har-
bor terrorists (visited Feb. 8, 1999) <http://dodgeglobe.com/stories/020899/new-.
02899017.shtml>.
152. See id. The theory is that the enemy - the terrorist - is using a neutral
country as a safe-haven.
153. See Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under Inter-
national Law: A Legal Analysis of the U.S. Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37
NAVAL L. REV. 49, 56 (1988).
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by terrorists, we will defend ourselves. This could be viewed as
a legal duty under international law.
Finally, it should be noted that fighting terrorism can be
analogized to fighting a war: it is combat.' 54 Where American
citizens and interests are threatened, it is the government's re-
sponsibility to act; the United States has a right to defend itself.
Again, while multilateral sanctions can play a role in keeping
states from harboring or supporting terrorists, they are too weak
an instrument standing alone.
3. Change U.S. law: make assassinations, in extreme
situations, legal once again:
It has been argued that assassination may "offer the best
available remedy" in combating terrorism. 155 This opinion is
based on the right of every nation to defend itself.156 In 1975,
however, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order stat-
ing, "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United
States shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassina-
tion."1 57 Despite this executive order, the Clinton Administra-
tion has quietly asserted that it may have a legal right to
assassinate leaders and members of terrorist organizations. 158
The Administration argues that even the United Nations be-
lieves that every nation has the right to defend itself.159 More-
over, a nine-year old U.S. Army memorandum states, "[tihe
clandestine, low visibility, or overt use of force against legiti-
mate targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of
peace, where such individuals or groups pose an immediate
threat... does not constitute assassination." 60
154. A duo of authors, in a letter to the L.A. Times stated that "it is an error
to view international terrorism as less than a profound problem, contingency
planing worthy of real warfare must start." Robert H. Kupperman & Jeff
Kamen, Opinion, The Tough Approach to Counter Terror, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1989, at 1.
155. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination
During Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J., 231, 249 (1991).
156. See generally id. (explaining his view on the right of self-defense).
157. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
158. See Paul Richter, Clinton Administration Reserves Right to Assassinate
Terrorists, MINEAPOLIS STAR TmB., Oct. 30, 1998, at A23.
159. See id. Also, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that
"[nothing] in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations..." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Beres, supra note 155, at
n.45 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
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This view may have support on Capitol Hill, as well. U.S.
Senator Charles Robb has stated that the Clinton Administra-
tion should consider changing the executive order banning as-
sassinations. 161 Still, this view is controversial. Assassination
may violate international norms, 162 and go against what the
United States stands for.163 Additionally, by using assassina-
tion to combat terrorism, the U.S. could, in essence, be using ter-
rorist-type methods itself. 164 The problem remains that one
cannot negotiate with terrorists. 165 Terrorists hardly have of-
fices worldwide and employees skilled in the art of diplomacy.
Many, if not all, of these terrorists are willing to give their lives
for their "cause."
The issue thus becomes one of what a nation can do to pre-
empt a potential attack. While one cannot outrightly condone
the use of assassination, it is probably justified in certain situa-
tions. For example, if the Central Intelligence Agency learns
that another embassy has been targeted for an attack, the
United States would be justified in assassinating the leaders of
the terrorist organization and those who would carry out the at-
tack. This is nothing more than self-defense.
4. International criminal tribunal:
A final significant problem in fighting terrorism is the ab-
sence of uniform laws addressing how to bring terrorists to jus-
tice. Each country has a different judicial system and treats
criminals differently. A good example of this problem is the
ongoing debate over how to bring to justice the two Libyan
agents who are said to be responsible for the bombing of Pan Am
103.166 Over 10 years after the bombing, the men known to be
161. See Justin Blum, Altering Assassination Ban Might Increase Pressure
on Saddam Hussein, Robb Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1998, at A22.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See J.F.O. McAllister, Should We Just Kill Him? As Tempting As It
May Be, Assassination Is A Bad Idea, TIME, Nov. 24, 1997, at 48.
165. One commentator stated that [negotiation with any terrorist,
whether state-sponsored or not, is problematic because that arena is eschewed
in many countries on the grounds that it lends legitimacy to terrorist causes. In
addition, since terrorist groups are not structured like states, they are incapa-
ble of negotiating effectively or enforcing their agreements." Murphy, supra
note 15, at 72.
166. In 1988, a Pan Am flight blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland. The men
responsible - two Libyan agents - have yet to be brought to justice. Both the
United States and Great Britain have been struggling with the Libyan Govern-
ment over how to assure the agents a fair trial. For an example of this di-
lemma, see generally Lee Michael Katz, U.S.: Libya acceptance 'falls short',
[Vol. 9:299
2000] FIGHTING TERRORISM WITH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 325
responsible have not yet been tried or punished. This is pre-
cisely the type of issue, proponents argue, that requires the es-
tablishment of an international criminal tribunal. It is
important to note, however, that on April 5, 1999, the two Lib-
yan agents believed to be responsible for the Pan Am bombing
were sent to the Netherlands to stand trial at The Hague. 167
While this may be viewed in a positive light, it also underscores
the importance of international cooperation in bringing ter-
rorists to justice. Indeed, it also shows that without a tribunal,
even if terrorists are tried, it requires a great deal of patience.
Existing law enforcement measures are problematic. Once
a terrorist is captured, a state generally has three options at its
disposal: release the terrorist, extradite the terrorist, or simply
refuse to extradite and prosecute the terrorist within the captur-
ing state. 168 Under conventional international law, no sovereign
state has an affirmative duty to extradite a person within its
territory to another country if no extradition treaty exists be-
tween them; the treaty is the source of the extradition policy. 1
69
An international criminal tribunal could therefore be used to
fight terrorism provided that it is given enough leeway and suffi-
cient powers with regard to jurisdiction so that sovereign coun-
tries may resolve enforcement issues.170
The establishment of an international criminal court fits
well with the expansion of global trade. The view that the world
is becoming increasingly interrelated, via a global economy,
could be the impetus behind the founding of this type of court.
There seems to be recognition within the international commu-
nity that certain crimes contain "transnational components"
that threaten world stability.17 ' The general consensus that is
widely accepted is that there exist certain limited circumstances
under which one should be held accountable to the international
USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1998, at Al (explaining the differing views between the
U.S., Britain and Libya).
167. See Helen Cooper, Libya Hands Over Pan Am 103 Suspects, As U.N.
but Not U.S. Suspends Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1999, at A28. In what
was called an unusual arrangement, the two suspects will be tried under Scot-
tish law at The Hague and would serve any sentence in Glasgow.
168. See Murphy, supra note 15, at 72-73 and 99.
169. See id. at 73. This is precisely the argument made by the Taliban in
Afghanistan: because we have no extradition policy with the U.S., we are under
no duty to extradite bin Laden, even if he were under our control. See Taleban
[sic] Refuses to Extradite Bin Laden, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 1999, at C12.
170. See Murphy, supra note 15, at 72-73 and 99.
171. Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for
the 21t Century, 13 CONN. J. INTL' L. 1, 3 (1998).
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community for violating international laws.17 2 Few would argue
that terrorism does not fall under this view. Again, with many
trade organizations in place, both regional and international,
now seems to be an opportune time to establish an international
criminal tribunal. Trade agreements foster a true international
community, based primarily on the shared desire for a strong
economy. In light of this, there may be a nexus between a strong
global economy and the desire for status quo. In other words,
let's not rock the boat when things are going well. Terrorists are
committed to disruption; having an unbiased international tri-
bunal could ease many potential international problems.
CONCLUSION
Secretary Cohen aptly stated that it is impossible for a gov-
ernment to guarantee the full safety of its citizens at home and
abroad. But no government, he says, can allow others to attack
its citizens with impunity if it hopes to retain the loyalty and
confidence of the citizens it is charged to protect. 173 The use of
unilateral sanctions to combat terrorism simply does not work
because they are too broad an instrument. However, multilat-
eral sanctions used in conjunction with other methods, such as
those mentioned above, have a much better chance of curbing
international terrorism.
The United States, and the rest of the world, can no longer
afford to wait until after a terrorist attack occurs. The policy to-
wards terrorism must be one of aggressive proactivity. Indeed,
economic sanctions have become a less valuable weapon due to
the emergence of the independent terrorist network. Economic
sanctions should be viewed as a link in a chain: they are weak
standing alone, but work well if combined with other means.
172. See id. at 4.
173. See Cohen, supra note 146.
326 [Vol. 9:299
